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WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

RECENT CASES
DIVORCE ON THE GROUND OF LIVING APART

In an action for divorce on the grounds of living apart for two consecutive
years without cohabitation the trial court denied the petition. On appeal the
Wyoming Supreme Court found sufficient evidence to reverse the trial court
and order a decree of divorce. The 1939 Wyoming Legislature had provided that
a divorce might be obtained where the "husband and wife have lived apart for
two consecutive years without cohabitation".1 This was amended in 1941 by
adding "but not upon such grounds if such separation has been induced or justified
2
by cause chargeable in whole or material part to the party seeking divorce".
Held, "that the fault of the plaintiff is the nature of an exception which must be
proven by the defendant". Dawson v. Dawson, 177 P. (2d) 200 (Wyo. 1947).3
The Dawson case calls attention to a relatively new and extremely liberal
ground for divorce. Although similar statutes have existed in a few states for
many year,4 it has been only recently that any sizeable number of states have
had such provisions. 5 The social policy motivating these statutes is a comparatively new concept in divorce law. 6 It is declared that the better interests of both the
parties and the state are served to legally end marriages that have ceased in fact
to exist. 7 In spite of a general accord of the social policy behind the statutes, the
variations in form and inconsistency of interpretations manifest the disagreement
as to the extent this policy should be carried. The main contention centers on
whether the grounds should be available to both spouses or limited to the so-called
innocent party.
1. Wyo. Sess. Laws 1939 c. 106.
2. Wyo. Sess. Laws 1941 c. 2; See Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 3-5906 for statute as
amended.
3. In the trial court the plaintiff (the husband) based his case on (1) indignities that
rendered his condition intolerable and (2) living apart for more than two yelars.
The trial court denied the divorce on the grounds that the allegations in the petition
were not corroborated as required by law. The Supreme Court pointed out that if the
ruling were under Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 3-5906 that it did not expressly require
corroboration of testimony and in the absence of such specific requirement that it is
only a rule of practice and not inflexible to require corroboration of testimony. In
overruling the trial court the Supreme Court relied heavily on the fact that both
parties testified to the separation existing for over eight years and accordingly was
fully proven.
4. Davis v. Davis, 102 Ky. 440, 43 S. W. 168, 39 L. R. A. (1897) ; N. C. Consol. Stat.
1919 sec. 1659.
5. 2 Vernier, American Family Laws 70 (1st. ed. 1932) lists only seven states as of
January 1, 1931. Rodell, Divorce Muddle, Life p. 80 (Sept. 3, 1945) lists sixteen states
and the District of Columbia. Keezer, Marriage and Divorce sec. 455 (3rd ed. 1946)
lists nineteen states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico a total of twenty-one
jurisdictions.
6. Herrick v. Herrick, 55 Nev. 59, 25 P. (2d) 378 (1933) ; See Note, 51 A. L. R. 763
(1927).
2 Vernier, American Family Laws 65 (1st ed. 1932) points out that in reality
these statutes permit divorce for incompatibility of temper but are confined to such
cases where the parties are unable to live together happily after a bona fide effort
extending over a reasonable time.
7. Dawson v. Dawson, 177 P. (2d) 200 (Wyo. 1947) ; Jegendorf v. Jegendorf, 157 P.
(2d) 280 (Wyo. 1945) ; Rozboril v. Rozboril, 60 Ariz. 247, 135 P. (2d) 221 (1943) ;
Otis v. Bahan, 209 La. 1082; 26 So. (2d) 146, 166 A. L. R. 498 (1946); Keezer,
Marriage and Divorce sec. 455 (3rd ed. 1946) ; See Notes, 97 A. L. R. 986 (1935)
111 A. L. R. 867 (1937) ; 166 A. L. R. 498 (1947).
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A few courts have limited the action to the party not at fault.8 These decesions are predicated on a reluctance to permit the party at fault to take advantage of his own wrong. 9 The majority of courts, however, have construed the
statutes to permit either party to sue. 10 This construction is justified on the
policy giving birth to the statutes.11 If the marriage has ceased to exist in fact
and.the parties are irreconcilable (presumed after the statutory period of separation), it makes little difference at whose feet the blame lies; society is benefited
to legally end it. In a few instances the state legislatures have relieved the courts
of this decision by permitting or denying the party at fault to sue. 12 The construction Wyoming might have placed on the 1939 act is unanswered since the
Supreme Court has never ruled under it. The 1941 amendment limiting the
action to the party not chargeable in whole or material part for the separation
presumably avoids this controversy. A close reading of the statute would certainly
seem to place Wyoming with the minority. However, the only two decisions interpreting the amendment renders this conclusion doubtful.
The first case, Jegendorf v. Jegendorf,13 decided in 1945, held, that the

cause of separation in the 1941 amendment did not refer to other grounds of
divorce already existent in the state, but was a question to be determined by the
trial court in the exercise of sound discretion and after considering all the circumstances. The reported case leaves the impression: that this separation was
caused more by the incompatibility of both of the parties than it was by the
conduct of either alone; that the plaintiff's conduct at the best was a contributing
factor acusing the separation; that her failing health was about all she possessed
to recommend her innocence to the court.14 The court decided the evidence (that
the plaintiff's health was endangered by a further continuance of the marital
8.
9.
10.

11.
12.

13.
14.

Campbell v. Campbell, 174 Md. 229, 198 Atl. 414, 116 A. L. R. 939 (1938) ; Pharr v.
Pharr, 223 N. C. 115, 25 S. E. (2d) 471 (1943) ; McGarry v. McGarry, 181 Wash.
689, 44 P. (2d) 816 (1935) ; Jakubhe v. Jakubhe, 125 Wis. 635, 104 N .W. 704 (1905).
The doctrine of recrimination enters into these dicesions to a large extent. Pharr v.
Pharr, 223 N. C. 115, 25 S. E. (2d) 471 (1943) ; See Note, 17 Am. Jur. 231 (1938).
Knabe v. Berman, 234 Ala. 433, 175 So. 354, 111 A. L. R. 864 (1937) ; Ryland v. Ryland, 174 P. (2d) 741 (Ariz. 1946) ; Larsen v. Larsen, 207 Ark. 543, 181 S. W. (2d)
683 (1944) ; Parks v. Parks, 116 F. (2d) 556 (App. D. C. 1940) ; Colston v. Colston,
297 Ky. 250, 179 S. W. (2d) 893 (1944) ; Otis v. Baham, 209 La. 1082, 26 So. (2d)
146, 166 A. L. R. 494 (1946) ; Gerdts v. Gerdts, 196 Minn. 599, 265 N. W. 811 (1936) ;
Kohlsaat v. Kohlsaat, 62 Nev. 485, 155 P. (2d) 474 (1945) ; Root v. Root, 57 R. I.
436, 190 Atl. 450 (1937).
"Not to punish vice or reward virtue, but to permit termination of marriages that
have ceased to exist in fact." Buford v. Buford, 156 F. (2d) 567 (App. D. C. 1946).
Ark Digest Stat. 1945 Supp. see. 4381 (follows majority) N. H. Pub. Laws 1926 c.
287 par. 6; Ver. Pub. Laws 1941 par. 3117; Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 3-5906 (follow
minority. New Hampshire and Vermont have no interpretations on the statute from
the court of last resort.)
157 P. (2d) 280 (Wyo. 1945).
"While the immediate cause of the separation was a disagreement concerning an
apparently trivial matter yet during the whole eight years of their married life her
testimony was that she was miserable; that she and her husband were not compatible
in the more intimate associations of married life; that the results of it all was that
her health failed and she suffered a nervous breakdown; that it became absolutely
necessary for her to submit herself to a doctor's care and treatment. (This was corroborated by a medical practioner.) If the health of one of the parties to the marital
tie is jeopardized by longer continuance thereof, and after eight years of endeavor
to make a success of the relationship we see nothing amiss in a conclusion on the
part of the trier of fact that the parties whose health is thus affected was not at fault
in withdrawing from cohabitation." 157 P. (2d) 280, 283 (Wyo. 1945).
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relations) was sufficient to support the finding that the plaintiff was not the cause
of the separation within the meaning of the amendment. Although this was a
liberal view as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the burden of proof,
there was no indication by the court that the burden was elsewhere than with the
plaintiff. The decision hardly pointed the way to the Dawson case.
In the instant case the Wyoming Court was guided in its conclusion by
Pierce v. Pierce,15 a Washington decision. In 1893 the Washington Court had
determined that their statute permitted only the innocent spouse to sue. 16 In 1921
the legislature changed the statute by adding, "In all such cases, the divorce may
be granted on the application of either husband or wife and either husband or wife
shall be considered the injured party. . .

."

The Washington Court held the

amendment to be nothing more than a rule of prima facie proof so that the
plaintiff need only plead and show that there has been a separation for a period
of more than five years.17 The Wyoming Court concluded that since our statute
was meant to liberalize the grounds for divorce that they would not be justified
in making a stricter interpretation than did the Washington Court. It is interesting to note that the courts in the two cases are dealing with what appear to be
antithetical amendments yet they reach the same results. As has already been
pointed out the Wyoming Court held on this point that "the fault of the plaintiff
is the nature of an exception which must be proven by the defendant." Since the
District Court had failed to determine the issue from this light the Supreme
Court decided that the defendant's testimony (that the plainiff was a "perfect
husband") did not sustain this burden of proof and that the plaintiff was therefore
not the cause of the separation within the meaning of the statute.18
15.

120 Wash. 411, 208 Pac. 49 (1922).

McDougall v. McDougall, 5 Wash. 802, 32 Pac. 749 (1893); Bickford v. Bickford,
57 Wash. 639, 107 Pac. 837 (1910).
17. Under Wash. Laws 1917 c. 106 which read "Where the parties are estranged and
have lived separate and apart for eight years or more and the court shall be satisfied that the parties can no longer live together" the parties may be granted a divorce, these same parties had been denied a divorce on the grounds that the plaintiff
was the cause of the separation. Wash. Laws 1921 c. 109 amended the 1917 act to
the effect that "A divorce may be granted to either or both parties in all cases where
they heretofore lived or shall hereafter live separate and apart for a period of five
consecutive years or more. In all such cases the divorce may be granted on the application of either husband or wife and either husband or wife shall be considered
the injured party and the period of five years or more shall be computed for the time
the separation took place." The court decided that the legislature did not intend to
permit either party to sue but that it meant to (1) change the law so that the statute
would be retroactive in that the period of separation contemplated by the statute did
not have to be prospective as indicated in the first Pierce case, and (2) that a rule
of prima facie evidence was established to the effect that the plaintiff was piesumed
to be the injured party.
But cf. Evans v. Evans, 182 Wash. 297, 46 P. (2d) 730 (1935) (the court found
both parties at fault in the separation instead of the plaintiff alone as in the Pierce
16.

18.

case).
As was noted in footnote one the plaintiff in addition to seeking a divorce on grounds
of living apart also relied on indignities that rendered his condition intolerable. He
offered evdence (mostly his own testimony) that the defendant brow beat him continually and made life a burden for him. Evidently in rebuttal of this evidence and
these particular grounds the defendant testified that they had never fussed and denied
the disagreements testified to by the plaintiff. She also said, "I had a wonderful husband; he was perfect". It is on this evidence that the court decided the case instead
of remanding it for retrial in light of the new interpretation they placed on the
statute.
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In summing up the Dawson case the Supreme Court gives what appears to
be the real reason behind the decision. They say, "We are unable to see how the
defendant or society will in any way be benefited by denying the plaintiff a divorce. There seems to be no possible hope of any reconciliation. The parties have
now been separated for over ten years, either of which apparently with the acquiescence of the defendant. If the aim of the statute is, as has been held, to legally
end a marriage which no longer exists in fact, then this, we think, is an appropriate case to carry that aim into effect."19 This position is reminiscent of the view
taken by the majority of courts who find the fault of the plaintiff no bar to the
action.
Regardless of whether this decision is termed a misconstruction of the 1941
amendment or not, it places Wyoming in a hazy ground between the majority and
the minority views. It no longer would seem necessary for the plaintiff to plead
or prove he was not the cause of the separation. Thus in a non-contested case the
question of whether the plaintiff was responsible for the separation will not arise,
and Wyoming is no different than the state that opening permits either party to
sue. Only where the defendant raises the issue and then sustains the burden of
proof (which may be difficult in view of the Jegendorf case) will Wyoming bar
the plaintiff from maintaining the action. Since so few divorces are contested,
this would seem to place Wyoming with the majority.
CHARLES
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PART TIME EMPLOYEES UNDER

MOTOR CARRIER ACT

Levinson, an employee whose chief duty was that of a foreman of loaders
of freight for a trucking concern which carried freight in interstate commerce,
brought action to recover' overtime compensation, liquidated damages, and attorney fees under the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Recovery was allowed in the Municipal Court of Chicago. On appeal the Appelate
Court of Illinois reversed the judgment. 1 The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed 2
and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, by a six to three
decision, that where a substantial part of an employee's activities affected safety
of operation he was subject to the Interstate Commerce Commission's jurisdiction
and deprived of protection of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Levinson v. Spector
Motor Service, 330 U. S. 649, 67 Sup. Ct. 931 (1947).
Section 207 of the Fair Labor Standards Act limits the work week at the
normal rate of pay of all employees subject to its terms and provides for overtime
compensation. Certain employees are excepted from its terms by Section 213 (b)
(1)3 including any employee with respect to whom the Interstate Commerce
19.

177 P. (2d) 200, 203 (Wyo. 1947).

1. Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 323 II. App. 505, 56 N. E. (2d) 142 (1944).
2. Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 389 I11.466, 59 N. E. (2d) 817 (1945).
3. 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C .A. Sec. 213 (b) (1).

